Introduction
Beliefs come in varying degrees. I am more confident that this coin will land Heads when tossed than I am that it will rain in Canberra tomorrow, and I am more confident still that 2 + 2 = 4. It is natural to represent my degrees of belief, or credences, with numerical values. Dutch Book arguments purport to show that there are rational constraints on such values. They provide the most famous justification for the Bayesian thesis that degrees of belief should obey the probability calculus. They are also offered in support of various further principles that putatively govern rational subjective probabilities.
Dutch Book arguments assume that your credences match your betting prices: you assign probability p to X if and only if you regard pS as the value of a bet that pays S if X, and nothing otherwise (where S is a positive stake). Here we assume that your highest buying price equals your lowest selling price, with your being indifferent between buying and selling at that price; we will later relax this assumption. For example, my credence in Heads is ½, corresponding to my valuing a $1 bet on Heads at 50 cents. A Dutch Book is a set of bets bought or sold at such prices as to guarantee a net loss. An agent is susceptible to a Dutch Book, and her credences said to be 'incoherent', if there exists such a set of bets, bought or sold at prices that she deems acceptable (by the lights of her credences).
There is little agreement on the origins of the term. Some say that Dutch merchants and actuaries in the 17 th century had a reputation for being canny businessmen, but this provides a rather speculative etymology. By the time Keynes wrote in 1920, the proprietary sense of the term 'book' was apparently familiar to his readership: 'In fact underwriters themselves distinguish between risks which are properly insurable, either because their probability can be estimated between narrow numerical limits or because it is possible to make a 'book' which covers all possibilities…' (21). Ramsey's ground breaking paper 'Truth and Probability ' (1926) , which inaugurates the Dutch Book argument 1 , speaks of 'a book being made against you ' (1980, 44; 1990, 79) . Lehman (1955) 
writes:
If a bettor is quite foolish in his choice of the rates at which he will bet, an opponent can win money from him no matter what happens… Such a losing book is called by [bookmakers] a "dutch book" (251).
So certainly 'Dutch Books' appear in the literature under that name by 1955. Note that Dutch Book arguments typically take the 'bookie' to be the clever person who is assured of winning money off some irrational agent who has posted vulnerable odds, whereas at the racetrack it is the 'bookie' who posts the odds in the first place. This article will concentrate on the many forms of Dutch Book argument, as found especially in the philosophical literature, canvassing their interpretation, their cogency, and their prospects for unification.
Classic Dutch Book arguments for probabilism

Probabilism
Philosophers use the term 'probabilism' for the traditional Bayesian thesis that agents have degrees of belief that are rationally required to conform to the laws of probability. (This is silent on other issues that divide Bayesians, such as how such 1 Earman (1992) finds some anticipation of the argument in the work of Bayes (1764) . degrees of belief should be updated.) These laws are taken to be codified by Kolmogorov's (1933) axiomatization, and the bestknown Dutch Book arguments aim to support probabilism, so understood. However, several aspects of that axiomatization are presupposed, rather than shown, by Dutch Book arguments. Kolmogorov begins with a finite set Ω, and an algebra F of subsets of Ω (closed under complementation and finite union); alternatively, we may begin with a finite set S of sentences in some language, closed under negation and disjunction. We then define a realvalued, bounded (unconditional) probability function P on F, or on S. Dutch Book arguments cannot establish any of these basic framework assumptions, but rather take them as given.
The heart of probabilism, and of the Dutch Book arguments, are the numerical axioms governing P (here presented sententially):
Classic Dutch Book arguments for the numerical axioms
We now have a mathematical characterization of the probability calculus.
Probabilism involves the normative claim that if your degrees of belief violate it, you are irrational. The Dutch Book argument begins with a mathematical theorem: 3 1. Nonnegativity: P(X) ≥ 0 for all X in S.
Normalization: P(Τ) = 1 for any tautology T in S.
Finite additivity: P(X
Dutch Book Theorem: if a set of betting prices violate the probability calculus, then there is a Dutch Book consisting of bets at those prices.
The argument for probabilism involves the normative claim that if you are susceptible to a Dutch Book, then you are irrational. The sense of 'rationality' at issue here is an ideal, suitable for logically omniscient agents rather than for humans; 'you' are understood to be such an agent.
The gist of the proof of the theorem is as follows (all bets are assumed to have a stake of $1):
Nonnegativity: Suppose that your betting price for some proposition N is negativethat is, you value a bet that pays $1 if N, 0 otherwise at some negative amount $-n, where n > 0. Then you are prepared to sell a bet on N for $-n-that is, you are prepared to pay someone $n to take the bet (which must pay at least $0). You are thus guaranteed to lose at least $n.
Normalization: Suppose that your betting price $t for some tautology T is less than $1.
Then you are prepared to sell a bet on T for $t. Since this bet must win, you face a guaranteed net loss of $(1-t) > 0. If $t is greater than $1, you are prepared to buy a bet on T for $t, guaranteeing a net loss of $(t-1) > 0.
Finite additivity: Suppose that your betting prices on some incompatible P and Q are $p and $q respectively, and that your betting price on P ∨ Q is $r, where $r > $(p + q).
Then you are prepared to sell separate bets on P (for $p) and on Q (for $q), and to buy a bet on P ∨ Q for $r, assuring an initial loss of $(r -(p + q)) > 0. But however the bets turn out, there will be no subsequent change in your fortune, as is easily checked. Now suppose that $r < $(p + q). Reversing 'sell' and 'buy' in the previous paragraph, you are guaranteed a net loss of $((p + q) -r) > 0.
So much for the Dutch Book theorem; now, a first pass at the argument.
The bookie is usually assumed to seek cunningly to win your money, to know your betting prices, but to know no more than you do about contingent matters. None of these assumptions is necessary. Even if he is a bumbling idiot or a kindly benefactor, and even if he knows nothing about your betting prices, he could sell/buy you bets that ensure your loss, perhaps by accident; you are still susceptible to such loss. And even if he knows everything about the outcomes of the relevant bets, he cannot thereby expose you to losses come what may; rather, he can fleece you in the actual circumstances that he knows to obtain, but not in various possible circumstances in which things turn out differently.
The irrationality that is brought out by the Dutch Book argument is meant to be one internal to your degrees of belief, and in principle detectable by you by a priori reasoning alone. Much of our discussion will concern the exact nature of such 'irrationality'. Offhand, it appears to be practical irrationality-your openness to financial exploitation. Let us start with this interpretation; in §4 we will consider other interpretations. 
Converse Dutch Book theorem
There is a gaping loophole in this argument as it stands. For all it says, it may be the case that everyone is susceptible to such sure losses, and that obeying the probability calculus provides no inoculation. In that case, we have seen no reason so far to obey that calculus. This loophole is closed by the equally important, but often neglected
This theorem was proved independently by Kemeny (1955) and Lehman (1955) .
Ramsey seems to have been well aware of it (although we have no record of him proving it): 'Having degrees of belief obeying the laws of probability implies a further measure of consistency, namely such a consistency between the odds acceptable on different propositions as shall prevent a book being made against you. ' (1980, 41; 1990, 79 Skyrms (1984) and Williamson (1999) give simplified versions of the corresponding argument.
Kolmogorov then analyzes the conditional probability of A given B by the ratio formula:
2 Thanks here to Daniel Nolan. Identifying an agent's value for P(A|B) with the value she attaches to this conditional bet, if she violates (Conditional Probability) she is susceptible to a Dutch Book consisting of bets involving A & B, ¬B, and a conditional bet on A given B.
Objections
We will not question here the Dutch Book theorem or its converse. But there are numerous objections to premises P1, P3, and P4.
There are various circumstances in which an agent's credence in X can come apart from her betting price for X: when X is unverifiable or unfalsifiable; when betting on X has other collateral benefits or costs; when the agent sees a correlation between X and any aspect of a bet on X (its price, its stake, or even its placement); and so on. Its upshot is that an agent whose preferences obey certain constraints (transitivity, and so on) is representable as an expected utility maximizer according to some utility and probability function. This threatens to render the Dutch Book argument otiose-the representation theorem has already provided an argument for probabilism. Perhaps some independent, probabilityneutral account of 'utility' can be given, but in any case, a proponent of any Dutch Book argument should modify P1 appropriately.
All these problems carry over immediately to de Finetti's Dutch Book argument for (Conditional Probability), and further ones apparently arise for his identification of conditional credences with conditional betting odds. Here is an example adapted from one given by Howson (1995) (who in turn was inspired by a wellknown counterexample, attributed to Richmond Thomason, to the socalled 'Ramsey test' for the acceptability of a conditional): You may assign low conditional probability to your ever knowing that you are being spied on by the CIA, given that in fact you are-they are clever about hiding such surveillance. But you presumably place a high value on the corresponding conditional bet-once you find out that the condition of the bet has been met, you will be very confident that you know it! It may seem curious how the Dutch Book argument-still understood literallymoves from a mathematical theorem concerning the existence of abstract bets with certain properties, to a normative conclusion about rational credences, via a premise about some bookie. Presumably the agent had better assign positive credence to the bookie's existence, his nefarious motives, and his readiness to take either side of the relevant bets as required to ensnare the agent in a Dutch Book-otherwise, the bare possibility of such a scenario ought to play no role in her deliberations. Chihara 1979, Kyburg 1978 , Christensen 1991 , Hájek 2005 But even granting the ill effects, practically speaking, of violating the probability calculus, it is a further step to show that there is some epistemic irrationality in such
violation-yet it is this conclusion (C') that presumably the probabilist really seeks.
After all, as Christensen (1991) argues, if those who violated probability theory were tortured by the Bayesian Thought Police, that might show violating probability theory is irrational in some sense-but surely not in the sense that matters to the probabilist.
P3 presupposes a socalled package principle-the value that you attach to a collection of bets is the sum of the values that you attach to the bets individually.
Various authors have objected to this principle (e.g., Schick 1986 , Maher 1993 Satan has cut an apple into infinitely many pieces, labeled by the natural numbers, and that Eve can take as many pieces as she likes. If she takes only finitely many, she suffers no penalty; if she takes infinitely many she is expelled from the Garden. Her first priority is to stay in the Garden; her second priority is to eat as many pieces as she can.
For each n (= 1, 2, 3, …), she is strictly better off choosing to eat piece #n. But the combination of all such choices is strictly worse than the status quo. Arntzenius, Elga
and Hawthorne consider similar problems with the agglomeration of infinitely many bets, concluding: 'There simply need not be any tension between judging each of an infinite package of bets as favourable, and judging the whole package as unfavourable.
So one can be perfectly rational even if one is vulnerable to an infinite Dutch Book.'
P4 is also suspect unless more is said about the 'sure' losses involved. For there is a good sense in which you may be susceptible to sure losses without any irrationality on your part. For example, it may be rational of you, and even rationally required of you, to be less than certain of various necessary a posteriori truths-that Hesperus is Phosphorus, that water is H 2 0, and so on-and yet bets on the falsehood of these propositions are (metaphysically) guaranteed to lose. Some sure losses are not at all irrational; in §4 we will look more closely at which are putatively the irrational ones.
Moreover, for all we have seen, those who obey the probability calculus, while protecting themselves from sure monetary losses, may be guilty of worse lapses in rationality. After all, there are worse financial choices than sure monetary losses-for example, even greater expected monetary losses. (You would do better to choose the sure loss of a penny over a 0.999 chance of losing a million dollars.) And there are other ways to be irrational besides exposing yourself to monetary losses.
Intepretations and variations
A gametheoretic interpretation
A gametheoretic interpretation of the Dutch Book argument can be given. It is based on de Finetti's proposal of a gametheoretic basis for subjective expected utility theory. A simplified presentation is given in Seidenfeld (2001) , although it is still far more general than we will need here. Inspired by this presentation, we will simplify again, as follows. Imagine a 2person, zerosum game, between players whom for mnemonic purposes we will call the Agent and the Dutchman. The Agent is required to play first, revealing a set of realvalued numbers assigned to a finite partition of statesthink of this as her probability assignment. The Dutchman sees this assignment, and chooses a finite set of weights over the partition-think of these as the stakes of corresponding bets, with the sign of each stake indicating whether the agent buys or sells that bet. The Agent wins the maximal total amount that she can, given this system of bets-think of the actual outcome being the most favorable it could be, by her lights.
The Dutchman wins the negative of that amount-that is, whatever the Agent wins, the Dutchman loses, and vice versa. Since the Dutchman may choose all the weights to be 0, he can ensure that the value of the game to the Agent is bounded above by 0. The upshot is that the Agent will suffer a sure loss from a clever choice of weights by the Dutchman if and only if her probability assignments violate the probability calculus.
This interpretation of the Dutch Book argument takes rather literally the story of a twoplayer interaction between an agent and a bookie that is usually associated with it.
However, in light of some of the objections we saw in the last section, there are reasons for looking for an interpretation of the Dutch Book argument that moves beyond considerations of strategic conflict and maximizing one's gains.
The 'dramatizing inconsistency' interpretation
Ramsey's original paper offers such an interpretation. Here is the seminal passage:
These are the laws of probability, which we have proved to be necessarily true of any consistent set of degrees of belief. Any definite set of degrees of belief which broke them would be inconsistent in the sense that it violated the laws of preference between options, such as that preferability is a transitive asymmetrical relation, and that if α is preferable to β, β for certain cannot be preferable to α if p, β if notp. If anyone's mental condition violated these laws, his choice would depend on the precise form in which the options were offered him, which would be absurd. He could have a book made against him by a cunning better and would then stand to lose in any event.
We find, therefore, that a precise account of the nature of partial belief reveals that the laws of probability are laws of consistency, an extension to partial beliefs of formal logic, the logic of consistency…
Having any definite degree of belief implies a certain measure of consistency, namely willingness to bet on a given proposition at the same odds for any stake, the stakes being measured in terms of ultimate values. Having degrees of belief obeying the laws of probability implies a further measure of consistency, namely such a consistency between the odds acceptable on different propositions as shall prevent a book being made against you. (1980, 412; 1990, 789) This interpretation has been forcefully defended by Skyrms in a number of works (1980, 1984, 1987a ); e.g.,
Ramsey and de Finetti have provided a way in which the fundamental laws of probability can be viewed as pragmatic consistency conditions: conditions for the consistent evaluation of betting arrangements no matter how described. (1980, 120) Similarly, Armendt (1993, 4) writes of someone who violates the laws of probability:
I say it is a flaw of rationality to give, at the same time, two different choiceguiding evaluations to the same thing. Call this dividedmind inconsistency.
Notice an interesting difference between the quote by Ramsey and those of Skyrms and Armendt. Ramsey is apparently also making the considerably more controversial point that a violation of the laws of preference-not merely the laws of probability-is tantamount to inconsistency. This is more plausible for some of his laws of preference (e.g. transitivity, which he highlights) than for others (e.g. the Archimedean axiom or continuity, which are imposed more for the mathematical convenience of ensuring that utilities are realvalued). However we resolve such questions, the 'inconsistency' at issue here is apparently something different again: a property of conflicting evaluations, and it is thus essentially preferencebased. Offhand, giving 'two different choiceguiding evaluations', as Armendt puts it, seems to be a matter of not giving identical evaluations, a problem regarding the number of evaluations-two, rather than one.
Understood this way, the alleged defect prima facie seems to be one of inconstancy, rather than inconsistency. To be sure, being 'consistent' in ordinary English sometimes means repeating a particular task without noticeable variation, as when we say that Tiger Woods is a consistent golfer, or when we complain that the chef at a particular restaurant is inconsistent. But this is trading on a pun on the word, and it need not have anything to do with logic. Notice that it is surely this nonlogical sense of the word that Ramsey has in mind when he speaks of 'a certain measure of consistency, namely willingness to bet on a given proposition at the same odds for any stake', for it is hard to see how logic could legislate on that.
But arguably, the kind of inconstancy evinced by Dutch Book susceptibility is a kind of inconsistency. Crucial is Armendt's further rider, that of giving 'two different choice guiding evaluations to the same thing'. The issue becomes one of how we individuate the 'things', the objects of preference. Skyrms writes that the incoherent agent 'will consider two different sets of odds as fair for an option depending on how that option is described; the equivalence of the descriptions following from the underlying Boolean logic.' (1987b, 2) But even two logically equivalent sentences are not the same thingthey are two, rather than one. To be sure, they may correspond to a single profile of payoffs across all logically possible worlds (keeping in mind our previous concerns about rival logics). But is a failure to recognize this the sin of inconsistency, a sin of commission, or is it rather a failure of logical omniscience, a sin of omission? (In the end, it might not matter much either way if both are failures to meet the demands of epistemic rationality, at least in an ideal sense.) See Vineberg (2001) That interpretation for the additivity axiom is controversial in a different way. Again, it may be irrational to give two different choiceguiding evaluations to the same thing.
But those who reject the package principle deny that they are guilty of this kind of doublethink. They insist that being willing to take bets individually does not rationally require being willing to take them in combination; recall the possibility of interference effects between the bets taken in combination. The interpretation is strained further for the countable additivity axiom; recall the problems that arose with the agglomeration of infinitely many transactions. In §6 we will canvass other Dutch Book arguments for which the interpretation seems quite implausible (not that Ramsey, Skyrms or Armendt ever offered it for them).
Christensen (1996) 
Diachronic Dutch Book arguments
The Dutch Book arguments that we have discussed are synchronic-all the bets are placed at the same time. Diachronic Dutch Book, or Dutch strategy, arguments are an important class in which the bets are spread across at least two times.
Conditionalization
Suppose that initially you have credences given by a probability function P initial , and that you become certain of E (where E is the strongest such proposition). What should be your new probability function P new ? The favored updating rule among Bayesians is conditionalization; P new is related to P initial as follows:
The Dutch Book argument for conditionalization begins by assuming that you are committed to following a policy for updating-a function that takes as inputs your initial credence function, and the member of some partition of possible evidence propositions that you learn, and that outputs a new probability function. It is further
assumed that this rule is known by the bookie (although even if it isn't, the bookie could presumably place the necessary bets in any case, perhaps by luck). The diachronic Dutch Book theorem, due to Lewis (1999) , states that if your updating rule is anything other than conditionalization, you are susceptible to a diachronic Dutch Book. (Your updating policy is codified in the conditional bets that you take.) The argument continues that such susceptibility is irrational; thus, rationality requires you to update by conditionalizing. As usual, a converse theorem is needed to complete the argument; Skyrms (1987b) provides it.
Objections
Many of the objections to synchronic Dutch Book arguments reappear, some with extra force; and some new objections arise. Indeed, the conclusion of this argument is not as widely endorsed as is the conclusion of the classic synchronic Dutch Book argument (namely, probabilism). There are thus authors who think that the diachronic argument, unlike the synchronic argument, proves too much, citing various cases in which one is putatively not required to conditionalize. Arntzenius (2003) , Bacchus, Kyburg and Thalos (1990) , and Bradley (2005) offer some.
Christensen (1996) argues that much as degrees of belief should be distinguished from corresponding betting prices (as we saw in §3), having a particular updating rule must be distinguished from corresponding conditional betting prices. The objection that 'the agent will see the Dutch Book coming' has also been pursued with renewed vigor in the diachronic setting. Developing an argument by Levi (1987) , Maher (1992) offers an analysis of the game tree that unfolds between the bettor and the bookie. Skyrms (1993) gives a rebuttal, showing how the bookie can ensure that the bettor loses nevertheless. Maher (1993, section 5.1.3) replies by distinguishing between accepting a sure loss and choosing a dominated act, and he argues that only the latter is irrational.
The package principle faces further pressure. Since there must be a time lag between a pair of the diachronic Dutch Book bets, the later one is placed in the context of a changed world and must be evaluated in that context. It is clearly permissible to revise your betting prices when you know that the world has changed since you initially posted those prices. The subsequent debate centres on just how much is built into the commitments you incur in virtue of having the belief revision policy that you do.
Then there are objections that have no analogue in the synchronic setting. Unlike the synchronic arguments, the diachronic argument for conditionalization makes a specific assumption about how the agent interacts with the world, and that learning takes place by acquiring new certainties. But need evidence be so authoritative? Jeffrey (1965) generalizes conditionalizing to allow for less decisive learning experiences in which your probabilities across a partition {E 1 , E 2 ,...} change to {P new (E 1 ), P new (E 2 ), ..., }, where none of these values need be 0 or 1:
Jeffrey conditionalization is again supported by a Dutch Book and converse Dutch Book theorem (although some further assumptions are involved; see Armendt 1980 , Skyrms 1987b ). Lewis insists that the ideally rational agent's learning episodes do come in the form of new certainties; he regards Jeffrey conditionalization as a fallback rule for less thanideal agents. Rationality for Lewis thus involves more than just appropriately 21 (Jeffrey conditionalization)
responding to evidence in the formation of one's beliefs; more tendentiously, it also involves the nature of that evidence itself. And it requires a commitment to some rule for belief revision. van Fraassen (1989) disputes this. There is even controversy over what it is to follow a rule in the first place (Kripke 1982) , which had no analogue in the synchronic argument. Note, however, that an agent who fails to conditionalize is surely susceptible to a Dutch Book whether or not she follows some rival rule. A bookie could diachronically Dutch Book her by accident, rather than by strategically exploiting her use of such a rule-even if the bookie merely stumbles upon the appropriate bets, they do still guarantee her loss.
How does the interpretation that Dutch Books dramatize evaluational inconsistencies fare in the diachronic setting? Christensen (1991) contends that there need be no irrationality in an agent's evaluations at different times being inconsistent with each other, much as there is no irrationality in a husband and wife having evaluations inconsistent with each other (thereby exposing them jointly to a Dutch Book). He offers a synchronic Dutch Book argument for conditionalization, appealing again to the idea that credences sanction as fair the relevant betting prices. See Vineberg (1997) for criticisms.
van Fraassen (1984) gives a diachronic Dutch Book argument for the Reflection Principle, the constraint that an ideally rational agent's credences mesh with her expected future credences according to:
P t (X | P t′ (X) = x) = x, for all X and for all x such that P t (P t′ (X) = x) > 0, where P t is the agent's probability function at time t, and P t′ is her function at later time t′. Various authors (e.g. Christensen 1991, Howson and Urbach 1993) More generally, the problem is that there are Dutch Book arguments for various norms-we have considered the norms of obeying the probability calculus, the This problem only becomes more acute when we pile on still more Dutch Book arguments for still more norms. As we now will.
Some more exotic Dutch Book arguments, and recent developments
We have discussed several of the most important Dutch Book arguments, but they are just the tip of the iceberg. In this section we will survey briefly a series of such arguments for more specific or esoteric theses.
SemiDutch Book argument for strict coherence
The first, due to Shimony (1955) , is not strictly speaking a Dutch Book argument, but it is related closely enough to merit attention here. Call a semiDutch Book a set of bets that can at best break even, and that in at least one possible outcome has a net loss.
Call an agent strictly coherent if she obeys the probability calculus, and assigns P(H|E) an agent who conditionalizes on E becomes certain of E (given any possible condition), despite its not being a tautology. Earman (1992) takes this to reveal a serious internal problem with Bayesianism: a tension between its fondness for Dutch Book arguments on the one hand, and conditionalization on the other. But there is no sense, not even analogical, in which semiDutch Books dramatize inconsistencies. An agent who violates strict coherence can grant that the outcomes in which she would face a loss are logically possible, but she can consistently retort that this does not trouble her-after all, she is 100% confident that they will not obtain! Indeed, an omniscient God would be semiDutch Bookable, and none the worse for it.
Imprecise probabilities
Few of our actual probability assignments are precise to infinitely many decimal places; and arguably even ideally rational agents can have imprecise probability assignments. Such agents are sometimes modeled with sets of precise probability functions (Levi 1974 , Jeffrey 1992 , or with lower and upper probability functions (Walley 1991) . There are natural extensions of the betting interpretation to accommodate imprecise probabilities. For example, we may say that your probability for X lies in the interval [p, q] if and only if $p is the highest price at which you will buy, and $q is the lowest price at which you sell, a bet that pays $1 if X, 0 otherwise.
(Note that on this interpretation, maximal imprecision over the entire [0, 1] interval regarding everything would immunize you from all Dutch Books-you would never buy a bet with a stake of $1 for more than $0, and never sell it for less than $1, so nobody could ever profit from your betting prices.) C. A. B. Smith (1961) shows that an agent can make lower and upper probability assignments that avoid sure loss but that nevertheless violate probability theory. Thus, the distinctive connection between probability incoherence and Dutch Bookability is cleaved for imprecise probabilities;
probabilistic coherence is demoted to a sufficient but not necessary condition for the avoidance of sure loss. Walley (1991) Schaffer (2007) argues that a compatibilist who knows that some event E is determined to occur, and yet who regards the chance of E at some time to be less than 1, is susceptible to a Dutch Book.
6.4 Popper's axioms on conditional probability functions Unlike Kolmogorov, who axiomatized unconditional probability and then defined conditional probability thereafter, Popper (1959) axiomatized conditional probability directly. Stalnaker (1970) gives what can be understood as a Dutch Book argument for this axiomatization.
More infinite books
Suppose that your probability function is not concentrated at finitely many pointsthis implies that the range of that function is infinite (assuming an infinite state space).
It is surely rational for you to have such a probability function; indeed, given the evidence at our disposal, it would surely be irrational for us to think that we can rule out, with probability 1, all but finitely many possible ways the world might be. Suppose further that your utility function is unbounded (although your utility for each possible outcome is finite). This too seems to be rationally permissible. McGee (1999) One might argue, on the other hand, that this just shows that Dutch Bookability is not always a sign of irrationality.
The theme of seemingly being punished for one's rationality in situations involving infinitely many choices is pursued further in Barrett and Arntzenius (1999) . They imagine a rational agent repeatedly paying $1 in order to make a more profitable transaction; but after infinitely many such transactions, he has made no total profit on those transactions and has paid an infinite amount. He is better off at every stage acting in an apparently irrational way. For more on this theme, see Arntzenius, Elga and Hawthorne (2004) .
Group Dutch Books
If Jack assigns probability 0.3 to rain tomorrow and Jill assigns 0.4, then you can Dutch Book the pair of them: you buy a dollar bet on rain tomorrow from Jack for 30 cents and sell one to Jill for 40 cents, pocketing 10 cents. Hacking (1975) with an example of a Dutch Book argument for a very specific constraint: in a particular scenario, a rational agent is putatively required to assign a particular credence. The scenario is that of the Sleeping Beauty problem (Elga 2000) . Someone is put to sleep, and then woken up either once or twice depending on the outcome of a fair coin toss (Heads: once; Tails: twice). But if she is to be woken up twice, her memory of the first awakening is erased. What probability should she give to Heads at the first awakening?
There are numerous arguments for answering ½, and for answering 1/3. Hitchcock (2004) gives a Dutch Book argument for the 1/3 answer. Bradley and Leitgeb (2006) dispute this argument, offering further constraints on what a "Dutch Book" requires in order to reveal any irrationality in an agent.
Conclusion
We have seen a striking diversity of Dutch Book arguments. A challenge that remains is to give a unified account of them. Is there a single kind of fault that they all illustrate, or is there rather a diversity of faults as well? And if there is a single fault, is it epistemic, or some other kind of fault? The interpretation according to which Dutch Books reveal an inconsistency in an agent's evaluations, for example, is more plausible for some of the Dutch Books than for others-it is surely implausible for McGee's Dutch Book, and for some of the other infinitary books that we have seen. But in those cases, do we really want to say that the irrationality at issue literally concerns monetary losses at the hands of cunning bookies (which in any case is hardly an epistemic fault)?
Or perhaps irrationality comes in many varieties, and it is enough that a Dutch Book exposes it in some form or other. But if there are many different ways to be irrational, the validity of a Dutch Book argument for any particular principle is threatened. At best, it establishes that an agent who violates that principle is irrational in one respect. This falls far short of establishing that the agent is irrational allthingsconsidered; indeed, it leaves open the possibility that along all the other axes of rationality the agent is doing as well as possible, and even that overall there is nothing better that she could do.
Moreover, it is worth emphasizing again that without a corresponding converse theorem that one can avoid a Dutch Book by obeying the principle, even the irrationality in that one respect has not been established-unless it is coherent that necessarily all agents are irrational in that respect. Dutch Books may reveal a pragmatic vulnerability of some kind, but it is a further step to claim that the vulnerability stems from irrationality. Indeed, as some of the infinitary Dutch Books seem to teach us, some Dutch Books apparently do not evince any irrationality whatsoever. Sometimes your circumstances can be unforgiving through no fault of your own: you are damned whatever you do. 
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